A desktop browser with x402 built in: when a page asks for payment, it pays in stablecoins and shows the content.
Security
dbbasic-browser signs cryptographic payment authorizations and, in proxy mode, terminates TLS. Please read this before running it against anything real.
Current status: not production-safe
This is early software. Do not point it at mainnet with real funds. It signs with a public test key, settlement is stubbed, and it has not been audited.
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately rather than opening a public issue. Email security@askrobots.com with details and a proof of concept if you have one. We aim to acknowledge within a few business days.
Threat model and design choices
The core security stance is that the resource server you are paying is not trusted to describe its own payment. See the README for the full rationale; in brief:
- Pinned asset registry. The EIP-712 signing domain and token decimals come from a
local allowlist (packages/engine/src/assets.ts), never from the server's 402 response. An asset that isn't pinned cannot be priced and will not be paid.
- Clamped authorization lifetime.
validBeforeis bounded locally (default 120s)
regardless of the server's requested maxTimeoutSeconds, so a server cannot bank a signed authorization and settle it much later.
- Rate- and pair-scoped budgets. Because EIP-3009 authorizations are signature-
based, your exposure equals exactly what you sign. Auto-approval is bounded by amount and by payment rate, scoped to (top-level origin × destination origin), so a hostile page cannot drain a balance with a flood of sub-cent requests.
Operational risks to understand
- The proxy is a TLS man-in-the-middle. To pay for
httpssubresources, the proxy
(packages/proxy) generates a local root CA and mints per-host leaf certificates. If you install that CA in your OS trust store, the CA private key can impersonate any website to you. It is written to ~/.dbbasic-browser/ with 0600 permissions and never leaves your machine, but treat it like a password, and uninstall the CA when you are not using the proxy. The browser (Electron protocol.handle) does not MITM and does not need a CA — prefer it.
- The signing key is the security boundary. Today the engine signs with a well-
known public test key (0x59c6…, the standard Hardhat/Anvil account). It is hard-coded so no one can mistake it for a real wallet. Never fund it. A real deployment must use an isolated session hot wallet, never the user's primary key.
- Auto-approval spends without prompting. By design, payments under the configured
threshold are made without a dialog. Review the policy limits (packages/engine/src/policy.ts) before funding a real wallet.
Supported versions
Pre-1.0: only the latest main is supported. There are no security backports yet.